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Abstract
We provide an economic analysis of two types of research exemptions: (1) experimen-
tation and research on the patented subject matter, and (2) academic (or non-commercial)
research with the patented invention. We ﬁnd that exemption for research on improving or
inventing-around the subject matter makes good economic sense in the context of perpetual
R&D competition, although it may not in the context of pioneer-follower innovation frame-
work. The best approach might be to provide broad research exemption on the research on
subject matter (more generally exemption for research using the knowledge disclosed in the
invention that is useful for improving its subject matter), while strong protection is provided
for a pioneering invention in the product market in terms of the breadth of claims. Exemption
for experimentation on the subject matter for the purpose of veriﬁcation of inventions also is
sensible. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that research exemption is a blunt tool for promoting
academic research, with a negative effect on the development of research tool. In addition,
it is not clear whether research exemption is necessary for efﬁcient and coordinated price
discrimination in favor of academic researches.
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11 Introduction
Whether and how research use of patented inventions should be exempted from infringement has
become an important issue in recent years. Increasing patenting of research tools and upstream
technologies, which were part of the public domain in the past, and related legal disputes in recent
years have triggered the close examination of this issue. For instance, when Integra Lifesciences
Ltd. sued Merck KGaA for using its cyclic RGD peptide, Merck’s defense was U.S. Patent
Law section 271(e)1 which exempts for certain experimental activities using patented process
or material for purposes reasonably related to the development and submission of information
for FDA approval (Integra vs. Merck). When Duke University defended its use of laser facility
without license from its former employee, physicist John M.J. Madey (Madey vs. Duke), it
claimed that its academic research institution status allowed for research exemption.1 The goal
of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of research exemption as innovation incentive.
Insomerespects, theissuesregardingresearchexemptionarenotdifferentfromthetraditional
issues discussed in the optimal patent design literature in sequential innovations in the context of
pioneer and follower research model. Exemption reduces patent protection, eliminating market
power. This will improve static or short-run welfare as with any reduction in patent protection.
And as with any patent protection, it may have a negative dynamic or long-run effect by reducing
incentive to investment in technology covered by the exemption.
There are however issues speciﬁc to research exemption. First, we need to examine whether
the above similarity holds in perpetual R&D competition model. Second, it is important for
us to consider if the legal distinctions between research on the invention and research with the
invention make sense or not. An invention has two related but distinct uses: using the knowledge
or information disclosed in the invention for its further progress vs. using the invention for the
technical utility for which the patent is applied for. In the case of research tool, the ﬁrst use is
1In case of Integra vs. Merck, the Supreme Court has upheld Merck’s claim (125 S.Ct. 2372, June 2005) although
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had found Merck not exempt because ‘the term “reasonably related” does
not embrace all activity related to the development and submission of information for FDA approval (June 2003).
In case of Madey vs. Duke, CAFC over turned a lower court decision and found infringement because Duke used
the patented equipment in the pursuit of its legitimate business objectives, “including educating and enlightening
students and faculty,” as well as securing “lucrative research grants,” thus was not entitled to the experimental use
defence (307 F.3d. 1351, October 2002). The Supreme Court has refused to hear the case, making this decision ﬁnal
(June 2003).
1for using the knowledge disclosed for further improving the research tool and the latter use is for
using that research tool for the direct use as a tool, which may results in scientiﬁc and technical
progress in other ﬁelds but not in this ﬁeld. Third, academic research generates simultaneously
signiﬁcant knowledge externality and very low proﬁt. The combination of the two might pose a
question of whether we can justify a special consideration for exempting academic research with
the invention.
What is research exemption?
Research exemption is a legal concept and we ﬁrst need to give an economic characterization.
We focus on the following two types of exemptions:
(1) Experimentation and research on the subject matter, and
(2) Academic (non-commercial) research with the patented invention.
The ﬁrst rule focuses on the objective of the research using the patented technology and by
deﬁnition is independent of who is doing the research. Experimental research on the subject
matter are done for the purpose of :
• Challenging the validity of the patent
• Conﬁrming the value of a patent for the purpose of licensing
• Experimentation for the purpose of improving the invention or ﬁnding its use
• Experimentation for inventing-around the invention.
The second exemption rule uses the academic or non-commercial nature of the researcher
(individual or organization) as the criterion. This rule can be reinterpreted to include non-
commercial research, assuming this can be well-deﬁned, by commercial institutions, not just
by an academic institution. The recent US court decision on Duke vs Madey, however, made
clear that the distinction by a user was not intended by the case law of the USA. Such distinction
does not exist in EU and not in Japan.
2Academic Use Commercial Use
Veriﬁcation of the invention Exempted in all regions
Research on subject matter for its Exempted in EU and Japan
improvement or inventing around (unclear in US)
Other use Probably infringement Infringement in all regions
in all regions
Table 1: The two rules of research exemption
The use of the invention for verifying the invention and for its improvement is exempted in
EU and in Japan. Veriﬁcation is legal in all regions, while the improvement is not. Exemption is
limited to verifying the patented matter in the U.S. This is summarized in Table 1.
In the following sections, we will provide an economic analysis of each rule. To the best
of our knowledge, the only full ﬂedged economic analysis of research exemption is provided by
Scotchmer (2004) which uses a two stage innovation model. We not only generalize her analysis
by incorporating the possibility that research exemption facilitates inventing around, but also add
the analysis in the context of perpetual innovation process.2 The latter analysis seems to be very
important for analyzing the economic effect of exemption of the research on subject matter.
2 Exemption for research on improving subject matter
Let us begin with an exemption for research on improving subject matter. It is important to note
that we cannot differentiate the improvement and inventing-around motivations ex-ante since
there is uncertainty in research on the subject matter. The product market implementation of the
follow-up invention may or may not infringe the original patented invention, depending on how
far the new invention is located with respect to the original invention. In examining the economic
effect of exempting research on improving subject matter, we use two models of sequential in-
novation. The ﬁrst model (we call it as the pioneer and follower research model) is a two stage
2After completing the draft of this paper, we have found that Gans(2005) also considers how research exemption
affects innovation in the context of perpetual innovation process, using the framework of Segal and Whinston (2005)
as we do. Our analysis, however, is quite different from his analysis, including the conclusion. In his formulation,
the ﬁrms expect to reach licensing agreement in the future, contingent on the success of the research of the current
entrant, and the current incumbent (the future entrant) pays the current entrant (the future incumbent) the licensing
fee to conduct research, independent of whether the former succeeds or not.
3innovation model, which is often used in industrial organization literature. The second one is
perpetual R&D competition model, which is often used in endogenous growth literature.
2.1 Pioneer and follower research model
We call the invention the production application of which will infringe the ﬁrst patent as an
improvement, and the invention the production application of which will not infringe the ﬁrst
patent as inventing-around. When an exemption for research on improving subject matter does
not exist, the follower must obtain a license before undertaking research, i.e., obtain an ex-ante
license. Then the pioneer can coordinate the second stage research.3 On the other hand, when
there is exemption for research on improving subject matter, the follower may not always ﬁnd
ex-ante licensing beneﬁcial.
Let us consider the following speciﬁc model, which builds on Scotchmer (2004). The fol-
lower invests x in follow-up research. It will succeed with probability p and fail with probability
1 − p. When it succeeds, the invention will be an improvement which enhances the value of
pioneer’s patent by v from v0 to v0 +v with probability θ, or it will invent-around the ﬁrst patent
and achieve value v0 + w, w > v, while the value of pioneer’s patent will drop from v0 to zero
with probability θ. We assume here that the invention is drastic when invent-around takes place,
so that competition between the old and new technology does not matter in the determination of
the value of the second technology.
We assume there are no competition policy constraints on an ex-ante license before the fol-
lower invests. If there is no ex-ante license, then the follower must obtain an ex-post license if the
outcome is an improvement. If an invent-around is achieved, then there is no need for an ex-post
license. The sequence of events is summarized in Figures 1 and 2 for the cases without and with
research exemption.
Without research exemption (Figure 1), there cannot be any investment by the follower with-
out an ex-ante license. Thus the threat point is (v0,0). The research of the follower will generate
3We assume that the pioneer licenses to the follower since only the follower invests in the follow-up research.
4the following expected joint proﬁt,
πjoint = p{(1 − θ)(v0 + v) + θ(v0 + w)} + (1 − p)v0 − x = (1 − θ)pv + θpw + v0 − x. (1)
Proﬁts with ex-ante license will be,
π
ex−ante∗
1 = v0 +
1
2





{p((1 − θ)v + θw) − x}. (2)
The ∗ indicates that it is the payoff without research exemption (Fgiure 1). The second stage
research will essentially become a joint venture between two ﬁrms.
Now we turn to the case where there is research exemption. Then ﬁrm 2 is able to invest with-
out an ex-ante license. It needs an ex-post license only when it improves, instead of inventing-
around. We start with ex-post licensing which is necessary when there is improvement (the lower
right rectangle in Figure 2) even when there is research exemption. The threat-point is (v0,−x)
sinceproductionisnotpossiblewithoutalicense. Withsuchanex-postlicense, thefollowergains
only half of the enhanced value of the ﬁrst patent, v, while it will bear the full cost of research.
On the other hand, the follower can gain all the monopoly proﬁt v0 + w when it invents-around
the pioneer.
The expected proﬁts of ﬁrms when the follower obtains ex-post license when necessary (Fig-
ure 2), instead of an ex-ante license, are given by
π
ex−post








+ θp(v0 + w) − x.
Note that the follower will invest only if
π
ex−post





+ θ(v0 + w)

> x. (3)
For the ex-post license to yield positive value for the follower, x must be sufﬁciently small, the
probability of success and the proﬁtability of inventing-around sufﬁciently large (recall w > v).
5For ex-ante negotiation,4 the threat point is either (v0,0) if there is no investment with only




2 ) if there is investment. When the threat point is (v0,0),
we still have ex-ante licensing with payoff equal to those of equation (2). When the threat-point
is the ex-post licensing ((3) holds and there is investment), then there is no gain from ex-ante





We make the following observation:
Lemma 1. With research exemption, there will be ex-ante licensing only when the follower will
not investment otherwise.
That is, even with research exemption, ex-ante licensing is useful for sharing the cost to
induce the follower to invest. When ex-post licensing occurs, research exemption beneﬁts the









If such probability is small, in particular, if it is zero, research exemption hurts the follower,
as pointed out by Scotchmer (2005), because its proﬁt deﬁned by the threat point (i.e. ex-post
licensing) is small.
The follower will invest without research exemption only when
π
ex−ante∗
2 > 0 ⇔ p((1 − θ)v + θw) > x. (5)
This condition coincides with the social efﬁciency condition when the private incremental values
of the innovations (v,w) coincide with social incremental values (the increase of the willingness
to pay). Without research exemption, the follower appropriates only half of the incremental value
from innovation. On the other hand, with research exemption, the follower is able to appropriate
the total value, v0 + w when it successfully invents-around.
Research exemption always leads to more innovation by the follower since it has the same
payoff and investment without research exemption when (3) does not hold, while (3) may still
4Such negotiation may not infringe competition law, since it does not constrain product market competition
6hold even if (5) does not hold. In particular, the follower invests only with research exemption
when the following condition is satisﬁed:
(1 − θ)pv
2
+ θp(v0 + w) > x > p((1 − θ)v + θw). (6)





When the probability of inventing around is sufﬁciently large, the prospect of sharing innovation
with the pioneer due to ex-post licensing is small, which encourages investment by the follower.
The welfare effect of research exemption is ambiguous, even if we focus on the efﬁciency
of the follow-up invention. As we just observed, the follower may have an excessive incentive
(condition (6) holds) to undertake the second stage research when there is exemption. Even
if the incremental value of follow-up research is negative, it may still wish to invest since it
does not internalize the loss of the pioneer due to the inventing-around (business stealing effect).
On the other hand, such investment may not be excessive once we take into account a possible
consumers’ gain when inventing-around takes place. A clear result from our analysis is that the
level of R&D by the follower is higher under research exemption since ex-ante agreement will
always ﬁll the gap when ex-post agreement is not chosen.
Proposition 1. Research exemption always enhances the investment by the follower. It enhances
follower’s proﬁt and reduces the pioneer’s proﬁt when the probability of inventing around is
sufﬁciently large ((4) holds). It can reduce economic welfare by discouraging efﬁcient ex-ante
contracting in the context of a pioneer and a (non-competing) follower research context.
These results complement the analysis of the oft cited analysis of ex-ante licensing and re-
search exemption ( Scotchmer’s (2004) ), which, however, rules out the possibility of inventing-
around. Without the possibility of inventing around, the follower always loses from research
exemption because the denial of ex-ante licensing forces the follower to bear the full innova-
tion cost. However, with the possibility of inventing around, research exemption can beneﬁt the
follower, since there is no need to obtain a license if inventing-around is the outcome. With re-
7search exemption, a signiﬁcant possibility of inventing around can make the ex-post licensing a
bargaining outcome. Thus, we do in fact observe ex-post licensing.
2.2 Perpetual R&D competition model
In many industries, innovation is perpetual in the sense that any innovation depends on past in-
novations as its knowledge basis, and it in turn contributes to future innovations. There is no
beginning and no end in the innovation process. In this kind of an innovation process, exemption
for research on improving subject matter does make sense, since it can not only avoid transaction
costs of licensing for research on the subject matter and the inefﬁciency of double marginaliza-
tion but also enhance innovation by increasing the difference between the return from the new
innovation and that from the old innovation.
We consider a perpetual stochastic R&D innovation process, where each ﬁrm is leap-frogged
byadrasticinnovationbyanotherﬁrm, andcomparetheequilibriuminvestmentsofthestationary
Markov equilibrium with and without research exemption, using the framework of Segal and
Whinston (2005). There are two ﬁrms, an incumbent (I) and an entrant (E). We denote the
continuation values by VI and VE. The incumbent monopolizes the product market and gets
proﬁt πm.
When the entrant succeeds in research and obtains a patent, it now becomes the monopolist
but must pay a ﬁxed proportion, a, of its monopoly proﬁt to the patent owner (previous incum-
bent). The parameter a depends on the scope of research exemption. Since the monopoly proﬁt
is also a parameter in our model, it does not make difference whether the payment for research
license depends on the proﬁt level or not. In addition such licensing payment reduces the proﬁt
available for the ﬁrms by the proportion 1−` due to transaction cost and double marginalization.
(We assume that such costs is born by a licensee for simplicity.) We assume a is not very large,
so that the current proﬁt of the monopoly producer is larger than that of the patentee. No patent
licensing for research due to research exemption would be characterized by the combination of
a = 0 and ` = 1. When the entrant is not successful, it can collect patent licensing revenue of
aπm from the incumbent. The entrant will successfully innovate with probability φ.5 An entrant’s
5We are assuming that patent royalties are contingency based, i.e., paid only when the innovation is successful.
8expected proﬁt is, thus,
φ(` − a)π
m + (1 − φ)aπ
m + δ {φVI + (1 − φ)VE} − c(φ),
where c(φ) is the research cost of the entrant choosing φ with c0(φ) > 0 and c00(φ) > 0 and δ < 1
is the discount factor. Parameter ` ( 2a < ` ≤ 1 ) accounts for the transaction cost or the cost of
double marginalization of patent licensing. The assumption ` > 2a guarantees that proﬁt of the
monopoly producer (licensee) is larger than proﬁt of the patentee (licensor). An entrant chooses
φ to satisfy
φ = Φ(w) = arg max
φ∈[0,1]
{φw − c(φ)}, (7)
where w is the entrant’s gain from innovation,
w = (` − a)π
m − aπ
m + δ(VI − VE).
Given w the innovation supply function (Segal and Whinston(2005)) Φ(w) depends only on c(φ).
Given our assumptions on c(φ), it is an increasing function.
With the optimal φ, the following relationships hold,
VI = φaπ
m + (1 − φ)(` − a)π
m + δ {φVE + (1 − φ)VI}, (8)
VE = φ(` − a)π
m + (1 − φ)aπ
m + δ {φVI + (1 − φ)VE − c(φ)}. (9)
The “innovation beneﬁt curve” (Segal and Whinston (2005)) is given by substituting VI and VE
by the solutions of equations (8) and (9):
W(φ,a,`) = (` − a)π
m − aπ
m + δ(VI − VE)
= (` − 2a)π
m + δ
(1 − 2φ)(` − 2a)πm + c(φ)
1 − δ + 2δφ
.
We are interested in how it depends on the parameters. It is evident that W(φ,a,`) is increasing
The effect of research exemption is independent of whether the payment is contingent or not although the optimal
rate will differ.






1 − δ + 2δφ
=
−2πm
1 − δ + 2δφ
< 0.
The ﬁrst term is negative, since research licensing penalizes the innovation by the entrant through
reducing the current proﬁt. The second term is also negative if φ < 1/2, since research licensing
equalizes the continuation values of the incumbent and the entrant.
The equilibrium innovation is determined as the intersection of the innovation supply and
innovation beneﬁt curves in (φ,w) space. Innovation supply curve is increasing in w, therefore
upward sloping, while W(φ,0,1) > W(φ,a,`) for all 0 < a < 1 and ` < 1. This means
the equilibrium innovation is unambiguously larger when there is research exemption, given the
stability conditions of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Research exemption increases innovation not only by reducing the transaction
cost and the inefﬁciency of double marginalization but also by increasing the difference between
the return from new innovation and that from the old innovation.
Note that research exemption will also result in lower price for consumers for each stage of
innovation in a perpetual R&D competition, since a ﬁrm can avoid incurring transaction cost for
research licensing and the inefﬁciency of double marginalization.
Although the above argument was for only two ﬁrms, the result can be generalized to more
entrants. It is shown in the Appendix that research exemption leads to greater innovation in the
case of three ﬁrms.
The case for research exemption becomes further strengthened when cross-industry knowl-
edge ﬂow is important for industrial research. This is because, when there are more licensors
from whom a ﬁrm has to obtain a license, both the cost of licensing transaction as well as the in-
efﬁciency due to double, triple or more marginalization become higher as the number of licensees
increase. In the presence of cross-industry knowledge ﬂow research exemption must be expanded
from the exemption of research on subject matter to that of research using the knowledge dis-
closed in the invention that is useful for improving its subject matter, since such knowledge can
be useful for the other technology areas as well.
10Theproceedinganalysisalsohighlightsthedifferencebetweenresearchexemptionandshorter
leading breadth (O’Donoghue (1998), Hunt (2004)) although they are both forms of weakening
patent protection. (Here we ignore transaction costs and double marginalization for research ex-
emption.) Research exemption may be interpreted as a way of weakening forward protection.
Both forward protection and exemption changes the distribution of proﬁts from the second inno-
vation between the ﬁrst and second innovators. In the case of leading breadth, however, shorter
breadth allows innovator to collect proﬁt only for shorter periods of time meaning the size of total
proﬁts as well as distribution of proﬁt is effected. The change in marginal beneﬁt and change in
total proﬁt means leading breadth can be too long or too short. Research exemption, on the other
hand, has no effect on the total proﬁt itself. Since each ﬁrm is both ﬁrst and second innovator (on
the average), total proﬁt is unchanged but research exemption increases the marginal beneﬁt of
innovation. Research exemption will always increase innovation.
The above discussions suggest that the economic effects of exemption for research on im-
proving or inventing-around the subject matter depend critically on the innovation process. Such
exemption makes good economic sense in the context of perpetual R&D competition, since a
ﬁrm can avoid incurring transaction cost for research licensing and the inefﬁciency of double
marginalization, while it enhances the value of new innovation relative to that of the old inno-
vation. On the other hand, research exemption can reduce economic welfare by discouraging
efﬁcient ex-ante contracting in the context of a pioneer and a (non-competing) follower research
context. The best approach might be to provide broad research exemption on the research on
subject matter (more generally exemption for research using the knowledge disclosed in the in-
vention that is useful for improving its subject matter), while strong protection is provided for
pioneer invention in terms of the breadth of claims in the product market. The availability of
broad protection of a pioneer patent encourages efﬁcient ex-ante licensing, while broad research
exemption on the research on the subject matter will eliminate the inefﬁciency of multiple licens-
ing in the perpetual innovation process and encourage new innovation.
113 Other justiﬁcations for research exemptions
3.1 Exemption for research on verifying subject matter
The case for exempting the experimentation on subject matter for veriﬁcation of the patented
invention with respect to patentability standard or its value seems to be strong. It would help
invalidating patents which do not meet patentability standard. Such invalidation has positive
externality, since it eliminates market power without merit, while the challenging ﬁrm can ap-
propriate only a small part of the introduction of competition, given that all the other potential
users of such invalidated patent will also gain. The availability of such investigation would have
the effect of encouraging a patent applicant to avoid ﬁling low quality patent applications and
to provide adequate disclosure. In addition, conﬁrming the value of a patent for the purpose of
obtaining a license would reduce information asymmetry between a potential licensor and a li-
censee. This will reduce the probability of breakdown of negotiations between a patentee and a
potential licensee, so that the technology market will expand.
3.2 Exemption for academic or non-commercial research use of a patent
First we start with interpreting what constitutes a non-commercial or academic use. The phrase
“merely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry”6 suggests
that non-commercial use means there is no pecuniary return from the experiment or research.
Returns can be absent because it is not possible to appropriate the returns, even if its applications
are marketable, due to great spillover.
With the proceeding characterization of non-commercial or academic use, we analyze three
potential justiﬁcations for the exemption for academic research use: spillover effect of academic
research, lower level of willingness to pay of those engaging in academic research and the coor-
dination problem in avoiding enforcing patents toward academic institutions. The ﬁrst potential
justiﬁcation is a signiﬁcant spillover effect of academic research. What separates academic or
non-commercial research from commercial research is that the former research output is freely
available for the public. Given this, the return from academic research is difﬁcult to appropriate
6Madey vs Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir.2002)
12commercially and it needs to be funded in some other way. However, it is important to note that
the source of externality in this context is the research output and not the use of a patent for the
research purpose per se.
There are two ﬁrms and a university. Suppose only ﬁrm 1 has a patent for a research tool.
Using this tool, a university can invest xU and realize revenue RU(xU). Firm 1 itself can beneﬁt
from the university research and by investing x1, it can realize revenue R1(x1 + αxU). α (0 <
α < 1) measures the extent of spillover from university to the ﬁrms.7 Firm 2 also beneﬁts from
university’s investment, R2(x2 + αxu). We consider ﬁrm 2 as a representative ﬁrm of many
ﬁrms which gain from the spillover, so that it is not possible for the university and ﬁrm 1 to
have a contract with ﬁrm 2. For the university, revenue may be from non-market sources such
as research funding which increases with publications which in turn is an increasing function of
research investment x. We assume R0 > 0 and R00 < 0 for both revenue functions.8 Proﬁts are,
πi(xi,xU) = Ri(xi + αxU) − xi, i = 1,2, πU(xU) = RU(xU) − xU.
We have ∂πi/∂xU = αR0
i > 0.
With research exemption, university is able to use the research tool and it invests ˆ xU and ﬁrm i
invests ˆ xi = β(ˆ xU), where ˆ xU maximizesπU(xU)andβi isﬁrmi’sbest-responsecorrespondence.
Denote the corresponding proﬁts by ˆ πi and ˆ πU. University will invest a positive amount with
research exemption and this beneﬁts the ﬁrms through spillover. However the level of university
research is inefﬁciently low, since the university does not internalize the spillover. That is,
∂
∂xU




2)|xU=ˆ xU > 0.
Without research exemption the university is unable to use the technology without a license.
Without license, xU = 0 and the ﬁrms choose investment xm
i , which maximizes πi(xi,0). Since
7Innovationwithinvestmentxcanbeprocessorproductinnovation. RevenuefunctioncanbeproﬁtfromCournot
competition given cost c(x) where investment x reduces marginal cost, i.e., process innovation (Suzumura, 1992)
Revenue may be proﬁt from Hotelling product differentiation where investment x increases intrinsic value of a good
v(x), i.e., product innovation.
8This is consistent with possible underlying structures in previous footnote.
13the best-response correspondence is downward sloping,
x
m
i > ˆ xi, while πi(x
m
i ,0) < πi(ˆ xi, ˆ xU).
If licensing is possible, research exemption enhances the university research and generates the
spillover to the ﬁrms.
A contract for coordinating ﬁrm 1’s and university’s investments can be negotiated with or
without research exemption. Even with exemption, both parties still have incentive to contract
because research exemption does not internalize the spillover from the university to ﬁrm 1. How-
ever the threat points will differ: threat point is (ˆ π1, ˆ πU) with exemption and it is (πm
1 ,0) without.
Note that ﬁrm 1 has better threat point allocation with exemption (ˆ πi − ˆ πU is likely to be smaller
than πm
i .)
The optimal contract will aim at achieving x0
U and x0





The spillover between ﬁrm 1 and the university is internalized with joint proﬁt maximization and
we have,
ˆ xU < x
0
U and ˆ x1 > x
0
1.
Although ﬁrm 1 beneﬁts from the coordination π0
1 > ˆ π1, the university is worse off by itself.
Firm 2 beneﬁts from the spillover although the university investment level is still too low.
From the proceeding simple example we can see that even if research exemption is relevant
due to the contracting difﬁculty between a ﬁrm with research tool and the university, it still does
not guarantee jointly optimal level of investments by ﬁrms and the university. Other methods,
such as subsidies directly targeted to the spillover would be more effective than research exemp-
tion to induce the right amount of University research. For instance, the input subsidy s should






ignoring the consumer surplus since we have not modelled the product market explicitly. Pro-
14viding exemption for academic research clearly harms the incentive of upstream research for
research tools, while it is only a very partial means for encouraging academic research.
The second potential justiﬁcation of exemption for academic or non-commercial research is
lower level of willingness to pay of those engaging in academic research. They may not be well-
funded. They may be more eager to develop a do-it-yourself solution. Charging lower price,
including zero, can be justiﬁed as a form of price discrimination, as in the case of academic
discount of software for instance. Although social welfare implication of price discrimination is
generally ambiguous, it may well increase social welfare when the difference of willingness to
pay is very signiﬁcant between academic users and commercial users of a technology. However,
a patentee has an incentive to price discriminate voluntarily, since it serves its own interest.
Exemption, on the other hand, prevents the patentee from appropriating any return from the
academic community. The efﬁcient price discriminating price for the academic price is probably
not zero, meaning the zero price constraint is a distortion. Thus, price-discrimination justiﬁcation
for exemption does not seem to be tenable.
The third potential justiﬁcation of exemption for academic or non-commercial research is to
solve the coordination problem in avoiding enforcement of patents against academic researchers.
A patentee may be willing to provide free access to its patents for academic research, if its com-
petitors follow suit. If competitors do not, it will face competitive disadvantage in R&D com-
petition due to its lower appropriation capability. Such collective commitment among patentees
for non-enforcing patents to academic researchers will enhance the level of academic research by
saving licensing fees, transaction costs, and by eliminating uncertainty with respect to potential
infringement of academic research. The enhanced research will in turn beneﬁt commercial ﬁrms
as a whole, the extent of which may be larger than the forgone licensing revenues. If this is
the case, academic research exemption may work as an efﬁcient collective commitment device
not to enforce patents toward academic research. However, if academic research is well-funded
and transaction costs are small, the intervention of creating academic use exemption would not
be necessary. In addition, ﬁrms may voluntarily collaborate in creating “patent commons” for
academic research, such as a SNP (Single nucleotide polymorphisms) consortium.
154 Conclusion
We have examined economic rationale of two types of research exemptions. The ﬁrst exemption
targets research on subject matter. We ﬁnd that the economic effects of exemption for research on
improving or inventing-around the subject matter depend critically on innovation process. Such
exemption is socially beneﬁcial in the context of perpetual R&D competition, since a ﬁrm can
avoid incurring transaction cost for research licensing and the inefﬁciency of double marginal-
ization, while research exemption can promote innovation by enhancing the return from new
innovation and reducing the return from old innovation. On the other hand, research exemption
can reduce economic welfare by discouraging efﬁcient ex-ante contracting in the context of a
pioneer and a follower research context. The best approach might be to provide broad research
exemption on the research on subject matter (more generally exemption for research using the
knowledge disclosed in the invention and which is useful for improving its subject matter), while
strong protection is provided for pioneer invention in product market in terms of the breadth of
claims. We also ﬁnd that exemption for experimentation on the subject matter for the purpose of
veriﬁcation of inventions make good economic sense.
The second exemption targets academic or non-commercial researches. The cases for such
exemption are large spillover of academic research, low willingness to pay and coordination
mechanism. We ﬁnd that these arguments are not very persuasive. Research exemption is a very
blunt tool for encouraging academic research and such exemption has a clearly negative effect on
the development of research tool. There are more efﬁcient policy choices, such as the combina-
tion of subsidies on academic research and cost-based licensing commitment of grantees, which
can be tailored better for the purpose. In addition, it is not clear whether research exemption
is necessary for efﬁcient and coordinated price discrimination in favor of academic researches,
given that we see extensive use of academic discounting and recent attempts to creating ”patent
commons” for academic research, such as the SNP (Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms) consor-
tium.
In evaluating the two rules we did not consider the cost of enforcement. Explicitly deﬁn-
ing what constitutes research ”on” subject matter may be feasible. On the other hand deﬁning
16exemption by the non-commercial or academic status of the researcher may be problematic.
We also did not examine the ”non-commercial use” doctrine which is the term used in U.K.
and Germany. It is conceivable that something that started as a pure intellectual pursuit result in
something with very high commercial value. The situation is different from the subject matter
exemption analyzed in section 2.1 since here successful development triggers patent protection.
Such an implementation of exemption will have the same option effect as the subject matter
exemption.
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18Appendix
We can generalize the perpetual R&D competition to more than two ﬁrms. Two non-incumbent
ﬁrms own the patent for which the incumbent must pay royalty. We consider three ﬁrms and
three states that each ﬁrm are in, Incumbent (I), Predecessor (E1), and Entrant (E0). We assume
only the Entrant innovates. If E0 succeeds, then E0 will be the next incumbent, I will become
the next E1, and E1 will become the next E0. If unsuccessful, all types remain the same type.
The incumbent pays royalty to two generations of proceeding technologies.
The values satisfy,
V0 = φ(1 − 2a)π
m + (1 − φ)aπ
m + δ {φVI + (1 − φ)V0} − c(φ),
VI = φaπ
m + (1 − φ)(1 − 2a)π
m + δ {φV1 + (1 − φ)VI}, (10)
V1 = φaπ
m + (1 − φ)aπ
m + δ {φV0 + (1 − φ)V1}. (11)
We substitute (11) into (10). Then we solve for V0 and VI. We can ﬁnd the innovation beneﬁt of
E0, w = (1 − 2a)πm + δ(VI − V0) (which is a very complicated expression). The innovation
supply curve is the same as with only one entrant. To determine the effect of research exemption




3(−δ + δφ + 1)πm
−3δ2φ + 3δ2φ2 + δ2 + 3δφ − 2δ + 1
.
This is negative for all φ ∈ (0,1) and δ > 0 not too large. In particular, it is negative for some
δ > 1. Research exemption will increase innovation and the result does not depend on the “front
loading” unlike Segal and Whinston (2005). That is, it is not the ability to collect beneﬁts earlier
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Fig 2: Research Exemption
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